The NGHC first determines that the General Convention is irrelevant for the purposes of disposing of the matter since South Africa never ratified it. 17 Second, the NGHC determines that Host Agreement, on its terms, 'does not confer immunity on the Member States or their representatives or delegates.' 18 Rather, the NGHC asserts, it 'confers immunity on the members and staff of the AU Commission, and on delegates and representatives of Intergovernmental Organisations.'
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In other words, 'delegates' refers to delegates of intergovernmental organisations and not delegates of AU member states. 13 Ibid. at § 28.9. See also § 30 where the Court states that Al-Bashir 'does not enjoy immunity in accordance with the rules of customary international law.' 14 Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the Commission of the African Union on the Material and Technical Organisation of the Meetings of the 30th Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee from 7 to 9 June 2015, the 27th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council from 10 to 12 June and the 25th Ordinary Session of the Assembly on 14 to 15 June 2015 (on file with author). 15 Article VIII of the Host Agreement. 16 Section C, Article V (1) of the General Convention. 17 See generally Southern African Litigation Centre v the Minister of Justice, supra note 2, at § 28.4. 18 Ibid, at § 28.10.1 19 Ibid. for the Court to request cooperation. 24 The Statute also details the various forms of cooperation.
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These include, for example, assistance with the identification and whereabouts of persons, the taking of evidence, the questioning of persons, the service of documents, execution of searches and the freezing and seizure of assets. 26 In addition, the Rome Statute includes a catch-all 'any other type of assistance' not prohibited by law.
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By far the most important, and far reaching form of cooperation, is the obligation to arrest and surrender a person sought by the Court. 28 The Rome Statute provides that a state, faced with a request to arrest and surrender a person, 'shall ... comply with the request to arrest and surrender'. 29 The Statute also provides directives for how a state should deal with competing requests for the arrest and surrender of a person, 30 as well as the procedural modalities for giving effect to the obligation to arrest and surrender. 
The Source of the Duty to Arrest the Sudanese President
As a general matter, the ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes within its jurisdiction occurring in the territory of a state party or committed by a person who is national of a state party. 32 Where jurisdiction is based on the former element, i.e. crimes occurring in the territory of a state party, the nationality of the accused persons is irrelevant. In other words, where crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court are committed by a national of non-state party in the territory of a state party, the Court will have jurisdiction. Similarly, where the jurisdiction is based on the nationality of the accused, i.e. the accused is a national of a state party; it is irrelevant whether the acts in question were committed on the territory of a nonstate party or state party. 38 See paragraph 5 of the Commentary to Draft Article 1 of the Draft Articles on the Immunity of Officials, supra note 37, where the Commission states that 'foreign criminal jurisdiction should be understood as meaning the set of acts linked to judicial processes whose purpose is to determine the criminal responsibility of an individual, including coercive acts that can be carried out against persons enjoying immunity in this context'. It is noteworthy that the Implementation Act does not provide discretion for the magistrates in whether to endorse the arrest warrant. Rather it provides that on receipt of the request to arrest and surrender a magistrate 'must endorse the warrant of arrest'. 50 The only condition, it appears, is that the arrest warrant and accompanying documents must show 'that there a sufficient grounds for the surrender of that person to the' ICC.
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The provisions in the Implementation Act relating to the actual surrender of a person under an arrest warrant of the ICC are quite elaborate. 52 The Act requires that a magistrate hold an enquiry in order to establish three facts, namely, whether the arrest warrant applies to the person in custody, the person has been arrested in accordance with procedures laid down in domestic law and whether the fundamental rights of the person as provided for in the is not similarly qualified. This means that section 10(9) of the Implementation Act does not have the 'trumping' effect of section 4(2) and should be read, 'without doing violence to [its] wording', 67 in such a way as being consistent with other legislative rules.
In Search of Legal Coherence in an Apparently Incoherent Network of Rules

General
While the Implementation Act applies to the case of Al-Bashir, there are conflicts between the different legal rules at various levels, making the legal position unclear at best and incoherent at worst. The Implementation Act, while in my view retaining al-Bashir's immunity before South African courts for the purposes of prosecution, strips him of 66 S 10(9) of the Implementation Act, which provides as follows: 'The fact that a person to be surrendered is a person contemplated in section 4 (2) (a) or (b) does not constitute a ground for refusing to issue an order contemplated in subsection (5). The multi-layered conflict described above, i.e. the conflict between the Implementation Act and customary international law as one layer; and conflict between customary international law and the Rome Statute as another layer; is further exacerbated by the fact that there appears to also be a conflict in the domestic laws. The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act (hereinafter the 'DIPA') has provisions that require the respect of Bashir's immunities.
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The law, as it pertains to the duty to arrest and surrender of al-Bashir, is therefore complex as it consists of various rules that are both mutually reinforcing and conflicting.
International Law and the Duty to Arrest and Surrender
As stated above, it is settled law that heads of state, like al-Bashir, have immunity ratione personae before the domestic courts of foreign states. 69 The International Law Commission (hereinafter the 'ILC') has described immunity ratione personae as immunity attaching to the court itself is only of tangential relevance for this article, I pause to point out that there is no basis for this conclusion in the Rome Statute. As I read the Statute, Article 27 applies to anyone who happens to find themselves before Court. Moreover, such a view is based on assumption that customary international law establishes immunity for proceedings before international courts -it does not. 85 Having made the conclusion that, in principle heads of non-state parties are immune from the jurisdiction of the ICC, the Pre-Trial Chamber then asserts that the duty of cooperation with the ICC imposed by the Security Council on Sudan, amounts to a waiver of the immunity of Sudanese official. 86 While this is not exactly the same as the view espoused by the majority of authors on this subject, it is similar in that it is based on the fact that the situation in Sudan was referred to the ICC by the Security Council.
The idea espoused by the majority of writers, that the referral places Sudan in the position of a state party, is not accepted by some authors. 87 The problem is that it is based purely on a fiction, and cannot be substantiated either by reference to the Rome Statute or Resolution 1593 itself. For one thing, Resolution 1593 places a duty on Sudan, it does not waive immunities of Sudan. The Council does have the power to deviate from the rules of international law, but whenever it does, it does so expressly and not by implications. Linked to this point, as a general rule, immunity is never waived implicitly but explicitly. 88 The notion of an implicit waiver of immunity is, therefore, a fiction. Second, subsequent to the adoption of Resolution 1593, and in the light of the controversy about whether Resolution 1593 affects the immunities of al-Bashir, the Council could have adopted a subsequent resolution confirming that indeed its intention was to waive the customary international law immunities of Sudanese officials. Moreover, twice a year, after the Prosecutor's briefing on ICC's activities in the situation in Sudan, members of the Security Council hold a debate on 84 Ibid, at § 26, Pre-Trial Chamber states 'Given that the Statute is a multilateral treaty governed by the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Statute cannot impose obligations on third States without their consent. Thus, the exception to the Court's exercise of jurisdiction provided for in Article 27 should, in principle, be confined to those States Parties who have accepted it.' At § 27, the Pre-Trial Chamber states that when 'the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court entails the prosecution of a Head of State of a nonState Party, the question of personal immunities might validly arise. The solution provided for in the Statute to resolve such conflicts is found in Article 98(1) of the Statute.' 85 See also Tladi 'The Immunity Provision in the AU Amendment Protocol', supra note 39, at 13 86 See DRC decision, supra note 3, at § 29. 87 See, e.g. Gaeta, supra note 42. had placed an obligation on all states to arrest and surrender. In such a case, the obligation to arrest and surrender would flow from the UN Security Council and would, by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter, trump other obligations -and the Council is remains free to decide imposing such an obligation. This leaves the possible conflict only in those cases, which are yet to manifest, in which a head of non-state party is sought by the ICC for crimes committed on the territory of a state party.
Other Domestic Legislation Relevant to Immunities
In assessing the state of the domestic law with respect to the duty to arrest and arrest alBashir, the starting point must be the Rome Statute Implementation Act. While section 4(2) of the Implementation Act reserves itself a place of priority by declaring that 'despite any other law to the contrary', status shall not be a defence against responsibility. It is important to emphasise that section 4(2) does not apply to the question of arrest and surrender. Section 10(9) of the Implementation Act, which addresses arrest and surrender and provides that status shall not be a reason for refusing to arrest and surrender, does not include the same Additionally, section 6(1) of the DIPA provides that 'representatives of any state, participating in an international conference or meeting convened in the Republic enjoy … such privileges and immunities as … are specifically provided for in any agreement entered into for that purpose...' 94 As noted above, contrary to the NGHC interpretation, the Host Agreement entered into for the purpose of the Summit does provide immunities for heads of state, including al-Bashir. In connection with the AU Summit, the NGHC refused to convey immunities also on the grounds that the Minister's Minute, which section 6(2) requires, could not trump the legislative provisions in the Implementation Act. This, however, is based on the erroneous belief that it is the Minister's Minute that confers immunity. However, while section 6(2) of the DIPA requires the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation to recognise the meeting, it is not the Minister's minute that confers immunity, but the DIPA itself, in particular section 6(1). In accordance with the Constitutional Court judgment in Quagliani, section 6(1) (b) provides for the incorporation of the Host Agreement and the immunities provided therein. 95 Thus, at the domestic law level, there is an apparent conflict between section 10(9) of the Implementation Act and the various provisions of the DIPA under which al-Bashir could claim immunity and inviolability. This conflict has to be addressed through ordinary rules of interpretation, in particular, the rule that so far as possible legislative provisions should be interpreted in such a way as to promote consistency. 96 What outcome such a process of interpretation yields is difficult to predict. Given the fundamental nature of the rules of immunity to international law and the international system, 97 one possible interpretation would be to require the respect of immunity only for international conferences of international organisations such as the AU or the UN. This would mean that for other visits including state visits and personal visits, al-Bashir, though still entitled to immunity and inviolability under international law, would not have such protection under South Africa law.
